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THE USE OF ARBITRATION TO AVOID
LITIGATION UNDER ERISA
RICHARD P. DONALDSON*
In response to a proliferation of private pension and welfare plans in
recent years, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Securi-
ty Act of 1974 (ERISA)' as a means of protecting the rights of the
participants and beneficiaries of these plans.' Each benefit plan covered
by ERISA must comply with its standards for reporting and disclosure,3
participation and vesting,4 funding,5 and fiduciary responsibility.6 The
Act also outlines procedures for administering and enforcing these statu-
tory requirements.7 Although criminal penalties are provided for willful
violations of the Act,8 civil actions brought by the Secretary of Labor,
*LL.B., University of Wisconsin Law School. Partner, Donaldson & Kiel, P.S.,
Seattle, Washington.
Author-Appreciation is expressed to Kathleen Boyle of the WM AM AND MARY LAW
REviEw for assistance in editing these materials.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Star. 829 [hereinafter cited as ERISA].
2. Congress outlined the policy of ERISA in section 2 (b) of the Act:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act to protect interstate
commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and
their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants
and beneficiaries of financial and other information with respect thereto, by
establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduci-
aries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies,
sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.
ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001(b) (1975).
3. Id. § 101-11, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1021-31. The administrator of the plan must furnish
a summary plan description to participants and beneficiaries. Id. § 101, 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 1021. Financial statements, actuarial statements, and insurance statements must be
filed annually. Id. § 103, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1023. In addition, if the participant or beneficiary
so requests in writing, the administrator must furnish a statement indicating the status
of the participant's benefit rights. Id. § 105, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1025. A participant or bene-
ficiary, however, is not entitled to receive more than one statement in any 12 month
period. Id.
4. Id. §§ 201-11, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-61.
5. Id. §§ 301-06, 29 U.S.C.A. H 1081-86.
6. Id. §§ 401-14, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-14. The fiduciary must discharge his duties "with
the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that
a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the
conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims . . . " Id. § 404(a) (1) (B),
29 U.S.CA. § 1104(a) (1) (B).
7. Id. §5 501-14, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1131-44.
8. Id. § 501, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1131. A person convicted of willfully violating the Act can
be fined up to $5,000, or imprisoned for a period of up to 1 year, or both. A corpora-
tion can be subjected to a fine of $100,000.
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participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries are the primary means of en-
forcement.9
Since pension and welfare plans are mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining, 10 plans governed by ERISA are often included in collective
bargaining agreements, many of which contain provisions requiring bind-
ing arbitration of disputes arising under the agreement. When a dispute
arises with regard to the negotiated plan and a civil action is brought
under ERISA to adjudicate the claim, the court must ascertain whether
ERISA requires it to assert its jurisdiction over the claim or to dismiss
the action in favor of the contractual arbitration process. It is submitted
that the type of claim presented for litigation will determine the juris-
diction of the court. The use of arbitration will avoid litigation of
ERISA benefit claims, but will not bar litigation of claims relating to
fiduciary responsibility.
BENEFIT CLAIMS
ERISA provides that a plan participant or beneficiary may bring a
civil action "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan,
to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights
to future benefits under the terms of the plan." 11 Such actions may be
brought in a federal district court or in a state court.12  Although
9. Id. § 502, 29 U.S.C.A. §1132. See H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973).
In this report the House Committee on Education and Labor stated: "[Tihe Committee
has placed the principal focus of the enforcement effort on anticipated civil litigation
to be initiated by the Secretary of Labor as well as participants and beneficiaries."
10. Under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 employers and unions have
a duty to bargain collectively. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (5), (b) (3) (1970). "To bargain
collectively" is defined as the "mutual obligation of the employer and the representative
of the employees to . . . confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment .... " Id. § 158(d). "Wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment" are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.
See Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960
(1949); Note, Application of the Mandatory-Pemnissive Dichotomy to the Duty to
Bargain and Unilateral Action: A Review and Reevaluation, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv.
918, 925 (1974). Pension plans were found to be "wages" and "conditions of employ-
ment" and hence mandatory subjects of collective bargaining in Inland Steel Co. v.
NLRB, supra. Cf. Allied Chem. Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157
(1971) (if the pension plan concerns only retired employees it is a permissible rather
than a mandatory subject of collective bargaining).
11. ERISA § 502(a) (1) (B), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132 (a) (1) (B) (1975).
12. Id. § 502(e) (1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(e) (1). Section 502 removed procedural and
jurisdictional obstacles that had hampered federal judicial enforcement of benefit
claims under interstate benefit plans. Id. § 502(e) (1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(e) (1) (broad-
ened jurisdiction); id. § 502(e)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(e)(2) (broadened venue); id.
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the statute itself does not mention arbitration as a means to resolve bene-
fit disputes, the propriety of arbitration is evidenced by the conference
report on the Act, which states that benefit claims brought by partici-
pants or beneficiaries in state or federal courts are to "be regarded as
arising under the laws of the United States in similar fashion to those
brought under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947." 13
Judicial Interpretation of Section 301
Section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
(LMRA) 14 permits an individual to bring suit in a federal district court
for "violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion." '" Although this'section does not expressly require the submission
of contract disputes to arbitration, it is settled that suits brought in fed-
eral or state court for breach of a collective bargaining contract will be
dismissed if the party bringing suit has not exhausted an arbitration
remedy included in the contract," or if a final arbitration award has been
rendered?
The Supreme Court first applied the congressional policy favoring
arbitration of labor disputes 8 to contractual claims brought under sec-
§ 502(f), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(f) (federal district courts have jurisdiction regardless of
amount in controversy or citizenship of. parties).
13. H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 327 (1974).
14. 29 U.S.C. 1 85(a) (1970).
15. Section 301 (a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in
this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, with-
out respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizen-
ship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970). Although section 301 is entitled "suits by and against labor
organizations," the Supreme Court held in Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195
(1962), that an individual employee may bring an action for breach of the collective
bargaining agreement in his own right as a third-party beneficiary to the union contract.
16. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
17. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713. 730
(5th Cir. 1974) (arbitrator's award for breach of the reopener clause final); Cady v.
Twin Rivers Towing Co., 486 F.2d 1335, 1337-38 (3d Cir. 1973) (disposition of seaman's
claim for wrongful demotion pursuant to grievance procedures final); Haynes v. United
States Pipe & Foundry Co., 362 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1966) (after final relief had been
granted under the collective bargaining agreement, the employee could not seek judicial
relief for wrongful discharge); Smith v. Union Carbide Corp., 350 F.2d 258 (6th Cir.
1965) (no trial de novo permitted for pension benefit claim subject to arbitration clause).
18. The congressional policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes is expressed in
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tion 301 in three companion cases decided in 196.'9 In this series of
landmark decisions the Court compelled arbitration of disputes covered
by collective bargaining agreements and precluded review of an arbi-
trator's decision in any dispute concerning a proper subject for arbitra-
tion under the terms of the labor contract.20
The Supreme Court extended its policy favoring arbitration of section
301 claims in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,2 which required the
exhaustion of contract grievance procedures before suit could be brought
under section 30122 unless the contract itself expressly provided that the
grievance procedures were not to be the exclusive remedy.23 If the
employee were allowed to forgo the contractual remedies, the Court
reasoned, the finality and hence the desirability of a contractually con-
section 203 (d) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, which- provides:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared
to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over
the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agree-
ment. The [United States Conciliation] Service is directed to make its
conciliation and mediation services available in the settlement of such griev-
ance disputes only as a last resort and in exceptional cases.
29 U.S.C. § 173 (d) (1970).
19. United Stdelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
20. In United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), suit was
brought under section 301 (a) of the LMRA to compel arbitration of a contractual
grievance. The Supreme Court held that when the parties to a collective bargaining
contract have agreed to submit all contractual disputes to arbitration, the arbitrator
must decide the merits of all issues covered by the contract. The function of the
court is limited to ascertaining whether the claim is governed by the contract.
The Court further held that in determining whether the dispute is covered by the
contract, "unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is
not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute," arbitration should
be ordered. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582-83 (1960).
To protect the finality of the arbitrator's decision, judicial inquiry into the merits of
the arbitrator's decision cannot be permitted. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
21. 379 U.S. 650 (1965). In Republic the employer failed to make severance payments
to an employee as required by the collective bargaining agreement. The agreement
provided a three-step grievance procedure followed by binding arbitration for settlement
of disputes arising under the contract. Instead of pursuing the prescribed grievance
procedure the aggrieved employee directly brought suit against the employer in state
court to recover the severance pay allegedly due.
22. Id. at 652-53.
23. Id. at 657-58. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184 n.9 (1967); Hayes v. Schmidt
& Sons, 87 L.R.R.M. 2466, 2468 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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firmed method of settling labor disputes would be defeated. Such a re-
sult would undermine congressional policy favoring arbitration of labor
disputes.24 Prior exhaustion of contractual remedies was similarly re-
quired by a state court in Tombs v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,2" in which
a suit was brought to determine an employee's rights under a collectively
bargained pension plan.
When suit is brought under section 301 after the contractual remedies
have been exhausted and a binding arbitration decision has been rendered,
the court will likewise dismiss the suit. The aggrieved employee has had
his remedy under the contract and is bound by the arbitrator's decision.28
This principle was applied to a pension benefit dispute by the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Smith v. Union Carbide Corp.27 Similar
results in disputes concerning employee benefit plans have been reached
24. 379 U.S. at 653. Accord, Durham v. Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc., 404 F.2d 864
(6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 998 (1969); Woody v. Sterling Aluminum Prod.
Inc., 365 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967).; Sturgill v. Lewis,
372 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Reeves v. Tarvizian, 351 F.2d 889 (1st Cir. 1965); Belk
v. Allied Aviation Serv. Co., 315 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1963); Tombs v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc., 83 Wash. 2d 157, 516 P.2d 1028 (1973). See generally Cox, Rights Under a Labor
Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REv. 601, 647-52 (1956).
Although the collective bargaining grievance procedures are intended to be the ex-
clusive remedy, exhaustion of contractual remedies will not be required if the aggrieved
employee can show that the union breached its duty of fair representation in pressing
his grievance. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967).
Failure to exhaust contractual grievance procedures results in dismissal of the legal
action without prejudice. Durham v. Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc., 404 F.2d 864, 865 (6th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 998 (1969).
25. 83 Wash. 2d 157, 516 P.2d 1028 (1973). In Tombs an employee who believed he
was entitled to larger pension benefits than he received failed to submit his claim to
arbitration as required under the labor contract before filing suit in state court. The
trial court heard the case on the merits and determined the benefits to which the em-
ployee was entitled; the state supreme court reversed the decision of the trial court,
holding that the employee must pursue the contractually determined method for settle-
ment of disputes before he could seek relief in the courts.
26. United Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713, 730 (5th Cir.
1974); Cady v. Twin Rivers Towing Co., 486 F.2d 1335, 1338-39 (3d Cir. 1973); Haynes
v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 362 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1966); Smith v. Union
Carbide Corp., 350 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1965).
The arbitrator's decision is final and binding only if it is fair and impartial and com-
plies with the requirements of due process. Tombs v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 83 Wash.
2d 157, 516 P.2d 1028, 1030-31 (1973).
27. 350 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1965). A judgment on the merits of the claim dispute
rendered by the trial court following a de novo hearing was reversed. Because the
arbitrators had not followed proper procedure, the court of appeals remanded the dis-
pute to the abitrators for proceedings in accordance with the terms of the contract. Id.
at 260-61.
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under state law. In Reeves v. Ta'uizian,28 the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit held that a plaintiff beneficiary, who had elected to proceed
with arbitration procedures included in a pension trust agreement, was
bound by the consequences of that arbitration. A federal district court
determined in Lieberman v. Cook29 that under Pennsylvania law submis-
sion of an issue to an arbitration panel precluded judicial review of that
issue, inasmuch as a beneficiary who invoked arbitration under the terms
of a profit sharing plan had "taken his one bite at the apple and [was]
not entitled to another one." 30
Thus, federal or state courts should dismiss suits brought under sec-
tion 301 for breach of the collective bargaining agreement if the ag-
grieved employee has not exhausted his contractual remedies or if a final
and binding arbitration award has been rendered. Because the contract
is the basis of the right claimed in such cases, it is proper to require com-
pliance with the predetermined grievance provisions for settlement of
disputes arising under the contract and to hold the complaining party
bound by the remedy that was negotiated under the contract.
31
A benefit plan that is covered by both a collective bargaining agree-
ment and ERISA provides a participant or beneficiary with a statutory
right to recover benefits under the plan as well as with a right based
upon the collectively bargained contract.32  Similarly, in many Title
VII 3 employment discrimination cases the right to nondiscriminatory
employment practices derives both from the statute and from a negoti-
ated provision of the collective bargaining agreement. In such Title VII
cases, prior exhaustion of contractual remedies is not required,34 and the
28. 351 F.2d 889 (1st Cir. 1965) (applying Massachusetts law).
29. 343 F. Supp. 558 (XV.D. Pa. 1972).
30. Id. at 562.
31. In Vaca v. Sipes the Court stated:
Since the employee's claim is based upon breach of the collective bargaining
agreement, he is bound by terms of that agreement which govern the man-
ner in which contractual rights may be enforced. For this reason, it is
settled that the employee must at least attempt to exhaust exclusive grievance
and arbitration procedures established by the bargaining agreement.
386 U.S. 171, 184 (1967).
32. Section 502(a) (1) (B) of ERISA grants the participant or beneficiary the right to
recover benefits. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132 (a) (1) (B) (1975).
33. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970),
as tamended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. II, 1972).
34. See King v. Georgia Power Co., 295 F. Supp. 943, 949 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (when
asserting statutory rights only the statutory procedures for relief must be followed);
Reese v. Atlantic Steel Co., 282 F. Supp. 905, 906 (N.D. Ga. 1967) (exhaustion of ad-
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aggrieved employee may have a trial de novo of the discrimination issue
after a final arbitrator's decision has been rendered.3 5 Conceivably, the
same rules could be applied to benefit claim suits under ERISA when
the claim is based upon both the contract and the statute. Such claims
should not be litigated in the same manner as Tide VII claims, however;
special policies and goals of Title VII, which are not applicable to other
statutes, such as ERISA, dictate that unique procedures be adopted to
aid in the enforcement of rights protected by Title VII. 6
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. and Satterwhite v. United Parcel
Service, Inc.: Implications for ERISA Benefit Claims
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,31 a decision that demarcated
the relationship between federal courts and grievance arbitration pro-
cedures in Title VII cases, the Supreme Court held that prior submis-
sion of a discrimination claim to final arbitration under the nondiscrim-
ination clause of a collective bargaining agreement did not preclude the
employee's statutory right under Title VII to trial de novo in a federal
district court.3 8 The Court based its decision upon a finding that Title
ministrative remedies not required); cf. Beaird, Racial Discrimination in Employment:
Rights and Remedies, 6 GA. L. REv. 469, 482 (1972).
35. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
36. See notes 47-50 infra & accompanying text.
37. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. resolved a conflict in
authority relating to the relationship between collective bargaining and Tide VII suits.
Prior to Alexander the federal courts had developed three different approaches to this
question. The first was that prior resort to arbitration would bar a subsequent suit
under Title VII on the theory that the aggrieved employee had made a binding election
of remedies. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by
equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971). Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428
F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970), represented the second approach, that the statutory right of
the employee to have his Title VII discrimination claim adjudicated in federal court
could not be barred by prior arbitration. In reaching its decision the court relied
heavily upon congressional intent that the federal courts be the final arbiter of a Title
VII discrimination claim. Id. at 313-14. The accommodation approach was devised in
Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 467 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972). Under this approach the
federal courts could defer to a prior arbitration award after first determining that the
arbitration procedure had been fair and had given adequate consideration to the Tide
VII claim.
See Isaacson & Zifchak, Fair Employment Forums After Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co.: Separate and Unequal, 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 439, 447-54 (1975); Comment,
Federal Courts-Labor Arbitration-Employment Discrinination-Federal Courts as
Primary Protectors of Title VII Rights, 28 RuTGERs L. REv. 162, 172-76 (1974).
38. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). In Alexander a black employee who had been discharged filed
a grievance under the nondiscrimination clause of the collective bargaining agreement
between his union and the company. After his claim had been submitted to final arbitra-
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
VII was designed to supplement the remedies under existing antidis-
crimination laws and institutions.39 Therefore, pursuit of redress in one
antidiscrimination forum, such as the arbitration process, does not pre-
clude pursuit of the supplemental judicial remedy under Title VII. 40
Furthermore, submission of a grievance to arbitration to vindicate a
contractual right cannot be determinative of the aggrieved employee's
independent statutory right since the court is the proper forum for the
determination of statutory rights.4'
Considering an overtime wage claim based upon a collective bargaining
contract and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,42 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit, in Satterwhite v. United Parcel Service,
Inc.,43 held the right to sue for overtime compensation under the Act4 4
to be precluded by prior submission of the claim to final arbitration
under the collective bargaining agreement. 5 In so holding, the court
rejected the employee's argument that Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
compels a court to permit judicial determination of a statutory right fol-
don and the arbitrator had rendered a decision adverse to his claim, the employee
brought suit in federal district court under Title VII. The district court held that the
employee was bound by the arbitrator's decision and dismissed the case. Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 346 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir.
1972), reVd, 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
39. 415 U.S. at 46-49.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 49-50.
42. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970).
43. 496 F.2d 448 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974). In Satterwbite an
employee sought to recover overtime compensation for the extra one-half hour worked
daily after the employer unilaterally eliminated coffee breaks. The collective bargaining
agreement provided that all employees were to be paid time and a half for hours worked
in excess of 40 hours per week or 8 hours per day. The claim was submitted to arbitra-
tion and the arbitrator determined that the employees were entitled to compensation
for the extra hours worked but allowed only straight pay as compensation. The em-
ployee then filed suit in federal district court under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
which provides that an employee is entitled to overtime compensation at the rate of
one and one-half times the regular hourly wage. The district court dismissed the case,
holding the arbitration award final. See id. at 449.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1970) provides in pertinent part: "[N]o employer shall
employ any of his employees ... for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such
employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above speci-
fied at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is em-
ployed."
The Fair Labor Standards Act also provides that an employee may maintain an action
against his employer in a state or federal court to recover unpaid overtime compensa-
tion. Id. § 216(b).
45. 496 F.2d at 452.
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lowing contractually established arbitration of a claim.46 The court at-
tributed the holding in Alexander to the unique nature of Tide VII
rights, stating that the strong national antidiscrimination policy em-
bodied in Tide VII calls for a special rule in discrimination cases with
respect to the relationship between federal courts and the process of
grievance arbitration.Y
The legislative history of Title VII demonstrates congressional intent
that a national antidiscrimination policy have priority over a policy
favoring arbitration of labor disputes.48 Since Congress manifested no
similar intent with regard to the policy of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
Satterwbite granted priority to grievance arbitration.49 Likewise, Con-
gress manifested no intent to give priority to the private enforcement
provisions of ERISA dealing with benefit claims; on the contrary, the
conference report reflects an intent that the proarbitration policy be ap-
plied to ERISA benefit claims.50
In Alexander the Court also stressed the concern of Title VII with
rights that attach to individuals. Unlike rights conferred on employees
collectively, such rights cannot be enforced through the collective bar-
gaining process.51 The emphasis on private enforcement of Title VII
rights is evidenced by inclusion in the statute of parallel and overlapping
remedies, which the individual may pursue in an effort to enforce his
rights under the Act.52
46. Id. at 450.
47. Id. at 450-51.
48. For expression of congressional intent that Tide VJI antidiscrimination policies
are to have the highest priority, see S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong, 2d Sess, pt. 1, at 11, 24
(1964); H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 18 (1963); E.R. REP. No. 914,
88th Cong, 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1-2 (1963). See also Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,
Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
49. 496 F.2d at 451.
50. The conference committee suggested that ERISA benefit claims are to be litigated
in the same manner as claims arising under section 301 of the LMRA. See H.R. REP.
No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 327 (1974).
51. 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974). Rights related to collective activity "are conferred on em-
ployees collectively to foster the processes of bargaining and properly may be exercised
or relinquished by the union hs collective-bargaining agent to obtain economic benefits
for union members." Id. The right to strike is such a collective right. See Mastro
Plastics Co. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
52. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is authorized to in-
vestigate charges of discrimination filed with it and to endeavor to eliminate the un-
lawful employment practice by informal means. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (b) (Supp. II,
1972). If the EEOC is unable to secure an informal conciliation, the EEOC, the Attor-
ney General, or the aggrieved party may seek an injunction or order of affirmative
action in the federal courts. id. § 2000e-5 (f). If the alleged discrimination occurs in a
19751
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Distinguishing wage claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act from
Title VII discrimination claims, the court in Satterwhite found that
wages and hours claims involve collective rights, are traditional subjects
of collective bargaining, and thus are well suited to determination by the
process of arbitration.5 3 Consequently, the national policy favoring arbi-
tration should be adhered to in the resolution of Fair Labor Standards
Act wage claims. A rule precluding judicial determination of a wage
claim previously submitted to final arbitration is consistent with this na-
tional policy. 4
Since pension and welfare plans are closely related to wages and are
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining,55 ERISA benefit claims,
like wage claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, derive from col-
lective rights. In light of Alexander and Satterwbite, the procedure for
grievance arbitration set forth in a collective bargaining agreement is the
appropriate forum for resolution of disputes concerning such collective
rights.56 Therefore, to promote the arbitration process, the rule of
Satterwhite precluding judicial determination of finally arbitrated claims
should be applied to ERISA benefit claims.
Proposed Regulations Issued Under ERISA
Under the authority of section 503 of ERISA, which requires every
employee benefit plan to adopt a reasonable benefit claims procedure, 57
the Department of Labor has issued proposed regulations endorsing the
use of the arbitration process to resolve ERISA benefit claims disputes.5 8
state that prohibits unlawful employment practices, relief may be sought initially through
state proceedings. Id. § 2000e-5 (c).
53. 496 F.2d at 451.
54. Id. at 452.
55. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cit. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960
(1949). See note 10 supra. See also Fanning, Connmentary: Private Pension and Wel-
fare Plans-the Role of the NLRB, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1527, 1530-31 (1972).
56. 496 F.2d at 451.
57. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1133 (1975). This section provides:
In accordance with regulations of the Secretary, every employee benefit
plan shall-
(1) provide adequate notice in writing to any participant or beneficiary
whose claim for benefits under the plan has been denied, setting forth the
specific reasons for such denial, written in a manner calculated to be under-
stood by the participant, and
(2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for
benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate named
fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.
58. Proposed Dept. of Labor Reg. § 2560.2, 39 Fed. Reg. 42242 (1974).
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Proposed regulation 2560.2 provides that "[a] claims procedure which
is established and maintained pursuant to a collective bargaining agree-
ment and which includes provision for binding arbitration of an appeal
of a claim denial will be deemed a reasonable claims procedure." 51 In-
asmuch as the regulation permits the submission of claims to "binding
arbitration," it may be inferred that courts should dismiss claims that
have been submitted to prior arbitration. Such a procedure would pre-
serve the finality of the arbitrator's decision.
Congressional Rejection of Choice of Remedies Under ERISA
The Senate version of ERISA envisioned arbitration of benefit claim
disputes, but this provision was omitted in the final bill.60 The applicable
provision would have required each benefit plan to provide an arbitra-
tion procedure for a dissatisfied plan participant or beneficiary, although
the participant or beneficiary could choose to arbitrate or sue as he might
deem appropriate."' The deletion of this unusual choice of remedies
arrangement does not imply that Congress was rejecting the use of
private arbitration as a sole and exclusive remedy; on the contrary,
coupled with the reference to section 301 of the LMRA," it supports
the proposition that arbitration is intended to be an exclusive remedy.
United States Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. ArguellesO demonstrates that a
choice of remedy provision would result in optional remedies, rather
than exclusive remedies. In Arguelles, an aggrieved seaman had the right
to bring an action to recover wages under either section 301 of the
LMRA or the Seaman's Statute.64 The Supreme Court held that be-
cause the seaman had a choice of remedies, a section 301 suit was merely
an optional remedy; therefore, the action could be brought without
prior exhaustion of contractual remedies."5 To insure the finality and ex-
clusiveness of an arbitrator's decision, Congress denied an aggrieved em-
ployee a choice of suing or submitting to arbitration under ERISA.
Elimination of a dual remedy provision precluded the possibility that
arbitration would be held to be merely an optional remedy.
59. Id.
60. H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 328 '(1974).
61. S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4870.
62. H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 327 (1974).
63. 400 U.S. 351 (1971).
64. 46 U.S.C. § 596 (1970).
65. 400 U.S. at 357.
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Arbitration Provisions Included in the Benefit Plan
Although the use of binding arbitration to avoid costly and lengthy
litigation of benefit claim disputes is desirable, some benefit plans are
not covered by a collective bargaining agreement containing provisions
for arbitration."6 In such cases provisions for arbitration can be included
in the benefit plan document.6 7 The plan document should provide for
hearings before the trustees of the plan on questions of the participant's
66. Jointly administered multiemployer benefit plans are an example of the type of
plan that would not be subject to a collective bargaining agreement.
67. The following language can be included in a benefit plan document to provide a
suitable claims procedure and to require binding arbitration of disputes arising under the
plan:
Hearings Before Board of Trustees-Arbitration
Any participant or beneficiary of a participant who applies for benefits
under this Plan and is ruled ineligible by the Trustees (or by an admin-
istrator acting for the Trustees) or who believes he did not receive the
full amount of benefits to which he is entitled, or who is otherwise ad-
versely affected by any action of the Trustees, shall have the right to re-
quest the Board of Trustees to conduct a hearing in the matter, provided
that he makes such a request, in writing, within 60 days after being ap-
prised of, or learning of, the Board's action. The Board then shall conduct
a hearing, at which the participant or beneficiary shall be entitled to present
his position. Any beneficiary may be represented at any such hearing by
an attorney or by any other representative of his choosing. Thereafter,
the Trustees shall issue a written decision reaffirming, modifying, or set-
tling their former action.
If the participant or beneficiary is dissatisfied with the written decision
of the Trustees, he shall have the right to appeal the matter to arbitration
in accordance with the labor arbitration rules of the American Arbitration
Association, provided that he submit a request for arbitration to the Board
of Trustees, in writing, within 60 days of receipt of the written decision.
If an appeal to arbitration is requested the Trustees shall submit to the arbi-
trator a certified copy of the record upon which the Trustees' decision was
made.
The question for the arbitrator shall be whether, in the particular instance,
the Trustees (1) were in error upon an issue of law, (2) acted arbitrarily
or capriciously in the exercise of their discretion, or (3) whether their find-
ings of fact were supported by substantial evidence.
The administration fees of the American Arbitration Association shall
be borne equally by the appealing party and by the Trust Fund, and the
arbitrator's fee and expenses also shall be borne equally, unless the arbitra-
tor, in his award, should assess such expenses against either of the parties.
The decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding upon the Trustees
and upon the appealing party.
The procedures specified in this section shall be the sole and exclusive
procedures available to a participant or beneficiary of a participant who is
dissatisfied with an eligibility determination, or benefit award, or who is
otherwise adversely affected by any action of the Trustees.
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right to benefits under the plan. 8 If the participant or beneficiary is
dissatisfied with the decision of the trustees, he should be permitted to
appeal the decision to arbitration. The document should further ex-
pressly provide that arbitration is to be the sole and exclusive remedy,
so that the courts will afford exclusiveness and finality to the arbitration
procedure. 9
FIDUCIARY REsPONSIBILITY CLAIMS
Although submission to the arbitration process avoids litigation of
ERISA benefit claims, it does not bar litigation of fiduciary responsibility
claims arising under the Act. ERISA provides that a plan participant or
beneficiary, a fiduciary, or the Secretary of Labor can institute civil
actions to redress breaches of fiduciary responsibility; 70 exclusive juris-
diction of such suits is vested in the United States district courts.7'
ERISA thus has departed significantly from existing enforcement pro-
cedures under the LMRA concerning actions for breach of fiduciary
responsibilities.
Fiduciary Responsibility Actions Under the LMRA
Standards for permissible employee benefit trust funds were articu-
lated in section 302 (c) (5) of the LMRA,72 and United States district
68. Such prearbitration hearings before the board of trustees must conform to "ele-
mental requirements of fairness," which normally would include "notice, a hearing at
which the applicant is confronted by the evidence against him, an opportunity to present
evidence in his own behalf, articulated findings and conclusions having a substantial
basis in the evidence taken as a whole, and a reviewable record." Sturgill v. Lewis, 372
F.2d 400, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
69. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184 (1967).
70. ERISA §3 502(a)(2), (3), (5), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1132(a)(2), (3), (5) (1975). The
Secretary of Labor or the Secretary of the Treasury may intervene when a fiduciary
responsibility suit is initiated by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary. Id. § 502(h),
29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(h).
Section 409 of ERISA, establishing liability for breach of fiduciary duty, provides in
pertinent part:
Any person who is a fiduciary . . who breaches any of the responsibil-
ities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this title shall be
personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting
from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such
fiduciary which have been made through use of. assets of the plan by the
fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief
as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.
29 U.S.C.A. § 1109(a) (1975).
71. ERISA § 502(e) (1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(e)(1) (1975).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (1970), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 186(c) (5) (Supp. 1975).
Under the statute an employer may make payments to a trust fund provided that:
(A) such payments are held in trust for the purpose of paying, either from
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courts were granted jurisdiction to restrain violations of that section.73
Although the federal courts have jurisdiction of claims for structural
violations of section 302 plans, a number of courts have held that there
is no federal jurisdiction of claims for breach of fiduciary responsibility. 4
Since section 302 of the LMRA provided no federal cause of action
for breach of fiduciary duty, the aggrieved party was forced to seek his
remedy for such breach in state courts.75 Pension and welfare plans
have become increasingly interstate in nature, however, making state
courts a less desirable forum for the litigation of alleged breaches of
fiduciary responsibility arising under the plan. 6 Recognizing the need
for uniform national standards of responsibility for fiduciaries and ap-
propriate remedies for breach of these standards,77 Congress created a
federal cause of action for breach of the fiduciary duties established in
principal or income or both, for the benefit of employees, their families
and dependents, for medical or hospital care, pensions on retirement or
death of employees, compensation for injuries or illness resulting from oc-
cupational activity or insurance...
(B) the detailed basis on which such payments are to be made is specified
in a written agreement with the employer, and employees and employers
are equally represented in the administration of. such fund . . .and
contain provisions for an annual audit of the trust fund ...
(C) such payments as are intended to be used for the purpose of pro-
viding pensions or annuities for employees are made to a separate trust
Id.
73. 29 U.S.C. § 186(e) (1970).
74. Haley v. Palatnik, 509 F.2d 1038, 1040 (2d Cir. 1975); Bowers v. Ulpiano Casal,
Inc., 393 F.2d 421, 424 (1st Cir. 1968); Insley v. Joyce, 330 F. Supp. 1228, 1231 (N.D. Ill.
1971); Porter v. Teamsters Health, Welfare & Life Ins. Funds, 321 F. Supp. 101, 103
(E.D. Pa. 1970); Giordani v. Hoffmann, 295 F. Supp. 463, 470 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
"Structural violations" relate to the conditions for establishment of a trust fund
described in LMRA S 302(c) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (1970), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 186(c)(5) (Supp. 1975). See note 72 supra. A federal court, in addition, may deter-
mine "whether a trust fund has been established in accordance with the important
prefatory condition in the statute that the fund must be '. .. for the sole and exclusive
benefit of the employees of such employer . . . .'" Giordani v. Hoffmann, 295 F. Supp.
463, 470 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (citation omitted).
75. See, e.g., Insley v. Joyce, 330 F. Supp. 1228, 1234 (ND. Ill. 1971).
76. The barrier that state procedural requirements can present to effective enforce-
ment of fiduciary responsibilities under interstate pension plans was recognized by the
Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee when it stated, "The intent of the Com-
mittee is ...to remove jurisdictional and procedural obstacles which in the past ap-
pear to have hampered effective enforcement of fiduciary responsibilities under state
law . .. ." S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), in 1974 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD.
NEws 4871.
77. ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001(b) (1975). "It is hereby declared to be the
policy of this Act to protect interstate commerce and the interests of. participants in
employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries.... by establishing standards of conduct,
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ERISA.78 ERISA also was designed to remove jurisdictional and pro-
cedural obstacles that had hindered effective enforcement of fiduciary
responsibilities under state law. 79
Superseding state law, ERISA has imposed a significant change in the
substantive law of fiduciary responsibilities, replacing varying state
fiduciary responsibility rules with a uniform federal rule.80 Federal pre-
emption was provided to promote uniformity in the enforcement of the
law in order to "help administrators, fiduciaries and participants . . .
predict the legality of proposed actions without the necessity of ref-
erence to varying state laws." I"
From the legislative history of ERISA it thus is apparent that Congress
made procedural changes in the manner of enforcing fiduciary respon-
sibility claims to facilitate access to the courts to redress such claims. A
further purpose of the changes incorporated in ERISA was to promote
uniformity in judicial enforcement of fiduciary responsibilities. There
is no indication that Congress intended the arbitration procedure of the
collective bargaining agreement to be a forum for redress of such breach-
es. On the contrary, since Congress expressly stated that benefit claims
were to be resolved in a manner favoring arbitration, its failure to state a
like intent for fiduciary responsibility claims reinforces the proposition
that federal courts need not decline jurisdiction of fiduciary responsibil-
ity claims in favor of the arbitration process.8 2
Fiduciary Responsibility Claims As Individual Rights
The proposition that fiduciary responsibility actions need not be sub-
mitted to prior binding arbitration is further supported by the distinction
responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing
for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts." Id.
78. Id. § 409, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1109. See Haley v. Palatnik, 509 F.2d 1038, 1042 & n.5
(2d Cir. 1975).
79. See note 76 supra. For provisions designed to overcome procedural obstacles, see
ERISA § 502(e) (2), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(e) (2) (1975). (nationwide service of process;
venue in the district where the plan is administered, where the breach occurred, or
where a defendant resides or can be found); id. § 502(f), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(f)
(federal jurisdiction regardless of the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the
parties).
80. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a) (1975), provides in pertinent part: "[T]he
provisions of this title . . . shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan .. ."
81. See S. REP. No.' 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD.
NEws 4865.
82. "'The enumeration of particular things excludes the idea of something else not
mentioned.' This is a primary rule of statutory construction." Bloemer v. Turner, 281
Ky. 832, 137 S.W.2d 387 (1939).
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drawn in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. between collective and in-
dividual rights. Unlike pension and welfare benefit claims under
ERISA, and wage claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, fiduciary
responsibility claims are not derived from traditional collective rights,
which are well suited to resolution by the arbitration machinery of the
collective bargaining agreement.84 Rather, like Title VII rights, the
right to bring an action for breach of fiduciary responsibility is an indi-
vidual right that is properly vindicated in the courts by the aggrieved
individual.9 Because it is a right inhering in the individual rather than
in the collective entity, the individual's right to bring an action for
breach of fiduciary responsibilities cannot be waived by the collective
entity in exchange for the economic benefits contained in the labor
agreement. " The individual's right to bring suit is not governed by the
labor contract, and therefore cannot be subordinated to a requirement
to submit grievances to arbitration under the collective bargaining agree-
ment.87
SUvMMRY
Arbitration can be used to avoid litigation of ERISA pension and
welfare benefit claims if the negotiated plan or related collective bargain-
ing agreement provides for arbitration of benefit disputes. This result is
dictated by congressional intent to have ERISA benefit claim actions ad-
judicated in the same manner as suits arising under section 301 of the
LMRA. In accordance with this intent, state or federal courts should
dismiss an ERISA benefit claim action if contractual grievance pro-
cedures have not been exhausted or if a final arbitration award has been
rendered.
Fiduciary responsibility questions that have caused a "deadlock" in the voting be-
tween employer and employee trustees on a jointly trusteed fringe benefit fund must
be excluded from the general rule that courts need not decline jurisdiction of fiduciary
responsibility suits in favor of the arbitration process. Under section 302(c) (5) (B) of
the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (B) (1970), such a deadlock is to be determined by
arbitration. ERISA did not repeal section 302. ERISA § 514(d), 29 U.S.G.A. § 1144(d)
(1975). See In re Trustees of Joint Welfare Fund, Operating Eng'rs., Local 14, 88
L.R.R.M. 3262 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). It is likely, therefore, that a fiduciary responsibility
suit, brought by one group of trustees against another in consequence of a deadlock,
would be dismissed pending arbitration under LMRA § 302(c) (5) (B), 29 U.S.C.
§ 186(c) (5) (B) (1970), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. 186 (c) (5) (B) (Supp. 1975).
83. 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974).
84. See notes 51-56 supra & accompanying text.
85. See id.
86. 415 U.S. at 51.
87. Id.
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Prior arbitration, however, will not bar litigation of ERISA fiduciary
responsibility claims even though the benefit plan is covered by a col-
lective bargaining agreement that is broad enough to provide for arbitra-
tion of fiduciary responsibility claims. The courts have been the tradi-
tional forum for adjudication of such claims, and Congress, in enacting
ERISA, manifested no intent that arbitration become the preferred
forum. Therefore, a fiduciary responsibility action brought under
ERISA in a federal court should not be dismissed in favor of the arbitra-
tion process.
